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Source: *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 24 (1998), pp. 159-181

Published by: Annual Reviews

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/223478>

Accessed: 22-07-2019 10:39 UTC

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GLOBALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY

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KEY WORDS: democratization, redemocratization, semiperiphery, global convergence, B-phase, hegemonic shifts, foreign capital investment, foreign intervention, social movements

ABSTRACT

By 1996, 66% of the countries of the world were using elections to choose their top leaders. This wave of democratization was accompanied by a paradigm shift that took the large number of historically clustered democratizations and called it a "wave." The scholarship has moved beyond overly episodic, event-oriented accounts of democratization to comparative work that investigates the impact of global processes on the political regimes of nations. This review examines numerous renderings of the linkage between globalization and democratization, including: favorable climate for democracy, global economic growth, global crises, foreign intervention, hegemonic shifts, and world-system contraction. Those authors who have advanced a stronger theoretical integration of the global and domestic processes offer exceptional insight into the momentous shifts that recently have occurred.

INTRODUCTION

In the last several decades, the world has experienced a democratic revival. In 1974, only 39 countries (25% of the world's independent nations) were democratic. By 1996, 66% were using elections to choose their top leaders (*Wall Street Journal*, June 25, 1996, p. 1). Dismantling totalitarian regimes and replacing them with democratic ones are momentous societal transformations. The new democracies were celebrated in a rich and diverse literature that ad-

dressed the antecedents and causes of the democratic transitions. Democratization in Greece, Spain, and Portugal begot a scholarship that focused on the historical and cultural distinctiveness of the respective cases. A few authors, observing the “historical clustering,” offered an analysis of Europe’s southern rim. Then, in the 1980s, several Latin American countries embarked on the transition to democracy. A new “transitions” literature connected these 1980 events to those of the 1970s. When that set of democratizations was joined (in the late 1980s and 1990s) by South Korean, Taiwan, Eastern Europe, and even South Africa, the “Third Wave” literature was born.

A wave of democratization is a group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time. A wave also usually involves liberalization or partial democratization in political systems that do not become fully democratic. (Huntington 1991, p. 15)

What has come to be known as the Third Wave heralded a paradigm shift in the contemporary scholarship. The innovation consisted in conceptually assembling these geographically and temporally dispersed events into a “wave.” It signaled a radical departure from the country-specific idiographic work which offered explanations that were overly episodic and event-oriented and insufficiently structural or cyclical (Wallerstein 1991, p. 1). The notion of a “wave” compels us to consider theoretical and methodological approaches that are comparative or even global. If observers of the 1970s transitions could comfortably reject internationally oriented theories, later scholars were deprived of this luxury as the number of transitions grew, and as they moved from one continent to another. Once established, the wave concept enveloped all transitions.

Some writers were critical of this warning that the wave is more like a hurricane that sweeps away anything in its path. Bunce argues that “a mere three years after the collapse of state socialism... eastern Europe was in virtually all accounts in ‘transition to democracy.’ Few paused to ask whether this was the best way to understand what is happening in this region...” (1993, p. 37). And with the exception of Czechoslovakia, Bunce insists, the Eastern European transitions are not like Southern Europe and Latin America (1993, p. 43). Likewise, the cases of the Dominican Republic and Ecuador are very distinct from those mentioned above, yet their transitions (1978 and 1979, respectively) have been grouped into the transition perspective (Conaghan & Espinal 1990).

As the voices of dissent suggest, the Third Wave does indeed have a staggering amplitude: It includes countries with a 50-year history of nondemocratic rule as well as countries that had substantial democratic interludes; it includes those terminating traditional authoritarian regimes, populist dictator-

ships as well as bureaucratic authoritarian ones; and it includes countries that dismantled their nondemocratic regimes with dramatic feats such as the destruction of a wall, the assassination of former leaders, or the uprising of the military against the authoritarian regime, as well as those in which the military itself negotiated the transition.

This celebratory literature also permits a wide amplitude in the definition of democracy. The debate over the essence of democracy has in no way been resolved in the wave literature. Advocates of popular democracies argue that not only must there be widespread participation of majorities in decision-making, but the democratic process must be used for achieving social and economic justice. Advocates of polyarchy, in contrast, accept a minimalist version in which a small group rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to restricted choices in periodic elections (Robinson 1996, p. 49). While the former stresses outcomes, the latter stresses processes. Likewise, the debate regarding the measurement of democracy has not been resolved in the wave literature. Should we use a binary measure (presence or absence of some institution associated with democracy) as early scholars did, or should we use a scale that includes numerous measures of liberty (Bollen & Jackman 1989, p. 612). Despite legitimate concerns regarding the classification of nations, I have passed over the definitional debate in order to highlight what authors have written about the causes of those transitions.

Przeworski traces two major strategies in the research on redemocratization: 1. macro-oriented comparative works that focus on objective conditions and speak the language of causal determination; and 2. "micro-oriented studies which tend to emphasize the strategic behavior of political actors embedded in concrete historical situations" (1986, p. 47). The first implies that regime transformations are determined by economic, social, or political conditions. But he asks, "Were all the intentional, self-reflective, strategic actors merely unwitting agents of historical necessity?" (1986, p. 48). Przeworski's resolution is to label the first as constraints that do not determine the outcome and then to ask within those constraints, "How do alternatives become organized?" (1986, p. 53). Many may take this second question as a charge for studying individual choice or social movements in isolation from the macroconstraints. The emergence of a global wave, however, necessitates that we analytically embed the second question within the first.

The principal intellectual challenge is to link global processes with domestic ones and then to show how those domestic processes influence the daily experiences of both those who rule and those who are ruled. The question "How can global change constitute a catalyst for the transition-to-democracy?" can be rewritten as several questions: 1. In what way do global shifts affect domestic economic and/or political processes? 2. How do these domestic changes lead elites to withdraw legitimacy from the nondemocratic regime? 3. How do

these domestic changes encourage those who are dominated to mobilize against the regime? and 4. When the walls come tumbling down, must democracy rise from the rubble? These questions are depicted as alternative causal paths to democratization (Figure 1), and each path is given a letter that will be used in summarizing the approaches of individual authors.

Who addresses these questions? The judgment of Kincaid and Portes regarding development studies is pertinent:

To cover the vast territory [of]...the sociology of development counts with only a relative handful of specialists. The traditional parochialism of American sociology is faithfully reflected in the fact that events affecting the majority of the world's population are usually either ignored or reduced to a few variables in quantitative cross-national studies. (Kincaid & Portes 1994, p. 3)

In the period following the exhaustion of the modernization perspective, area studies remained the domain of a few sociological outliers. Those who had been working on totalitarian states (Goldfarb 1992), authoritarian regimes (Linz & Stepan 1978), underdevelopment, or dependent development (Evans




Figure 1 Overview of causal paths

1979) were best positioned and equipped to analyze the new phenomenon of (re)democratization. Those early transition scholars were followed by others who introduced a comparative perspective that was often cross-decade and cross-continental (for example, Seidman 1994 and Zubeck & Gentleman 1994). In contrast to the bibliographies of standard research monographs, which tend to implode in the matter of citations, the literature cited in this review essay draws from a wide range of scholarship.

THYMOS AND MORAL ROT

Why did the authoritarian and totalitarian states wither away? Fukuyama's answer is poetic—the human need for expression (*thymos*) leads to the perfect political form (democracy). Having achieved global democratic acceptance, he tells us, we have reached the “end of history.” Chirot asserts that the economic failures of state socialism and moral rot of the whole system rendered the system morally unbearable for the citizenry. While undeniably cogent, many such *ex post facto* accounts are silent on the issue of threshold. Why did the *thymos* quotient reach its tipping point so many centuries after the first Greek model? How did societies live so long with moral rot? In the final analysis, *ex post facto* models such as these often invoke “loss of legitimacy” as their main explanatory factor. The loss of legitimacy is certainly the quintessential process (Linz & Stepan 1978). It is so quintessential, however, that it borders on the tautological: The regime fell, thus it must have lost its legitimacy. Rather than upgrade lost legitimacy to the principal causal mechanism, we should incorporate it as the critical intervening process and look to models that specify: 1. who specifically withdraws legitimacy, and 2. what accounts for their withdrawal. The transition scholarship includes excellent idiographic and ethnographic studies that cannot all be mentioned here. For this essay, I have drawn from those monographs that grapple with the notion of a global catalyst. By piecing together numerous works that touch on some aspect of the connection between globalization and redemocratization, we can assemble a more comprehensive answer.

THE GLOBAL CONNECTIONS

Authors who utilize a global linkage in their analysis offer *prima facie* evidence that the Third Wave transitions are not isolated, coincidental, or randomly distributed in time or space. Despite their shared conviction regarding the global or world-system nature of the democratic transitions, they diverge significantly in their designation of a global mechanism. I have sorted the global factors into six categories.

Favorable International Climate

Democratization in one country becomes the favorable climate, and thereby a partial cause, of democratization in others. Huntington argues that a favorable global atmosphere operates through diffusion, a demonstration effect, or snowballing. When knowledge of political events is transmitted around the world, it may trigger comparable events elsewhere (1991, p. 33). Success in some parts of the world may encourage other countries to see democratization as a solution for their problems. Huntington thinks that greater snowballing in the later phase of the Third Wave is due to the expansion of global communications and transportation, particularly satellites, computers, and faxes (1991, p. 101) (Figure 1, path C).

Numerous authors invoke the effect of a favorable international climate. In his analysis of the Greek transition, Diamandouros describes how the climate was favorable to democracy: "In Europe... the disrepute into which authoritarian rule had fallen since the days of Fascist experiments; the widespread acceptance of the legitimacy of democratic rule and of populist politics; the multiplicity of international organizations committed... to the preservation and defense of democratic politics..." (1986, p. 146). The snowballing concept also has been employed in explaining the fate of the Eastern bloc. Holmes argues that Gorbachev's criticisms of socialism and his own proposed reforms, "helped to undermine the legitimacy of communists everywhere" (1997, p. 26). Because of a favorable environment—the conviction that the USSR would not intervene—Eastern Europeans pursued their own goals (Figure 1, path C).

At a very general level, the favorable-climate perspective helps us understand why, at the moment of regime collapse, democracy possesses more legitimacy than monarchy, reformed totalitarianism, or some other alternative. It leaves unspecified, nevertheless, a number of crucial dynamics. What accounts for the shift of the early trendsetters? Why didn't the model diffuse sooner after the Greeks developed it? Why do some nations cast off their democratic form? The favorable-climate answer presumes a model of action—the persuasiveness of an idea—in which some of the main puzzles are simply assumed away. By failing to take seriously the social, economic, and political processes at both the global and domestic levels, the model does not contribute much to our understanding of these tremendous transformations.

Global Industrialization and Development

A second perspective in the literature contends that global economic development promotes global democratization. Global growth has eliminated precapitalist niches and resulted in a shift from capital intensive to technology intensive production. This metamorphosis is sometimes referred to as a "conver-

gence” because it appears as though the preexisting distinction between industrialized and nonindustrialized countries is disappearing. The globalization of production unleashes mechanisms that lay the groundwork for democracy in at least four ways. Some scholars stress the technological innovations in communication and transportation that accompany global capitalism. For other scholars, industrialization brings with it the growth of professional and a middle class, the main carriers of democracy. Still others see industrialization as bringing with it the growth of the working classes, the main agents of democratization. A fourth approach claims that global growth undermines interventionist (nondemocratic) states. Global industrialization lessens the previous gap between industrialized and nonindustrialized countries: Their economic profiles begin to converge.

A first version of the global industrialization argument privileges the role of technology and communications. Technological innovations in communication, it is argued, make it more difficult to withhold information from the masses and under these circumstances, democracy flourishes.

“Just as the growing technology of control helped to shape authoritarian regimes in Latin America, new information technology is shaping Latin American democracies, especially with regard to elections and public debate in the media” (Chalmers 1990, p. 2) (Figure 1, path E,G4).

Markoff offers a plethora of factors, including communication and transportation. He attributes the world-wide subscription to democracy to the rise of communication and transportation, which increases the capacity of ordinary people to develop and sustain social movements (1996, p. 44). He suggests that the rise in communication means that both the governing elites and social movements pay attention to what other social movements and governing elites are doing elsewhere (1996, p. 20). Once the wave begins, Markoff argues, models (of sit-ins, underground cells, symbols, etc) and ideas (of social injustice) can spread throughout the networks of communication and transportation (Figure 1, path D,G3 and E,G4). Verdery, in a similar way, claims that technology and communications undermined socialism and contributed to democratization. Solidarity’s strikes in 1980 were “rebroadcast instantly into Poland via Radio Free Europe and the BBC mobilizing millions of Poles against their Party” (1993, p. 19) (Figure 1, path E,G4).

Drawing on a large body of historical literature, Crenshaw ventures an empirical evaluation of the preindustrial legacy and its impact on democracy. He argues that advanced systems of transportation and communication endowed some early agrarian states with higher levels of spatial articulation, which encouraged the adoption of political democracy (1995, p. 715). A rise in his agricultural density index was associated with a rise in the democracy index. While there is a wide intellectual moat between his theoretical exposition and the twelve regression models based on data from 1960 to 1990, the endeavor

reflects an enormously creative leap beyond the routinely cited but regularly untested effects of communication and transportation.

Overall, the technology models are appealing, but they ignore the quandary that social and communication networks are content-neutral; fascist and anti-democratic ideas can spread equally well. Such models do not tell us why waves begin or why they are democratic rather than authoritarian. These models have to assume the first perspective, namely that the international climate values democracy rather than some alternative. Such models, Therborn asserts, do not show much interest in the social dynamics (1977, p. 7).

A second rendition of global growth can be found among Huntington's explanatory factors. "[E]conomic development appears to have promoted changes in social structure and values that, in turn, encouraged democratization" (1991, p. 65). He suggests that global economic integration and industrial development provide greater resources for distribution and compromise, create nongovernmental sources of wealth and influence, and open societies "to the impact of the democratic ideas prevailing in the industrialized world" (1991, p. 66). It is akin to the classic Lipset notion (1960): Increased industrialization brings with it the development of the middle class, which serves as a buffer between the wealthy and the impoverished. And, like Lipset, Huntington posits that development increases the literate and educated population who "develop characteristics of trust, satisfaction, and competence that go with democracy" (1991, p. 66). These social strata (as individuals, not as a collectivity) are the carriers of democratic values and the agents in the democratization process. Rueschemeyer et al in their review of the redemocratization literature on Latin America also judge that "the middle classes played a more prominent role in the process of democratization than they had in advanced capitalist societies" (1992, p. 222) (Figure 1, path A,G2).

A third inescapable social transformation that accompanies global capitalism is the growth of the working class. The legal emancipation of labor, the creation of free labor markets, and the concentration of industrial workers create conditions that foster worker strength and invite popular struggles. In cases where the working class needs and/or has allies, the process unfolds as democratization rather than revolution or socialist transformation (Therborn 1977, p. 34). An excellent synthesis of these arguments can be found in the work of Rueschemeyer et al (1992). The works highlighted below are a sample of those that explicitly link the prodemocratic militancy of working classes to a global phenomenon.

Maravall and Santamaria describe how global convergence generated new working classes in Spain and contributed to the breakdown of the Franco regime. Despite the fact that they begin with the obligatory "exhaustion of the economic model and the fragility of the grounds on which the regime was based" (1986, p. 74), their analysis hinges upon a global factor. Spain em-

barked on a development project that invited foreign capital and linked Spain to international markets. The economic project was accompanied by social transformations such as a rural-to-urban migration and an increase in the industrial population. These social changes reinforced the organization of the democratic opposition and made it difficult to maintain the conservative patterns that had characterized the Franco regime (1986, p. 75). Their analysis points to the working class as the agent of a regime transformation. Whereas the second approach offered individual attitudes of trust and civility as the democratic building blocks, this third approach requires the collective action of workers. And, rather than relying on a favorable climate for democracy, it provides an endogenous understanding of why democracy is the preferred regime replacement. Revolution and democracy offer the best opportunities for workers to satisfy their material needs, and excluding the possibility of a socialist revolution, democracy is the preferred successor to Franco's regime (Figure 1, path A,C,G4). But as Therborn argues, "[T]he working-class movement was nowhere capable of achieving democracy by its own unaided resources..." (1977, p. 34). This suggests then that our analytical framework need go beyond simply pinpointing the strength of one class or another as the carrier of democracy.

A fourth variant of the global growth model is the most nuanced in terms of the interplay between globalized capitalism and class-state relations. As production becomes more electronically based and capital moves quickly around the world without stopping for long periods in production processes, it limits the role of national governments. As globalizing capital hollows out the state, new conflicts emerge between the (nondemocratic) state and fractions of the capitalist class. Huntington's minimalist version is that "broad-based economic development involving significant industrialization may contribute to democratization..." (1991, p. 65) because industrialization leads to a complex, diverse, and interrelated economy that is more difficult for authoritarian regimes to control.

What is named "industrial convergence" at the global level is tantamount to "late industrialization" for individual nations. With the globalization of production, some countries that were previously categorized as peripheral or semiperipheral (because of their integration into the world-system as raw material exporters) have graduated from that rank. Many countries like Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa grew fastest during the golden years of global expansion. The fourth interpretation pinpoints how global convergence alters the relationship that the state has with fractions of capital on one hand and with the working classes on the other.

Seidman's work on South Africa and Brazil exemplifies this analytical perspective. She asks how the elite, who had cooperated with the previous authoritarian state and depended upon it for protection and support, came to

challenge that state and to acknowledge the legitimacy of workers' demands; and how "militant strikes and organization...spread from factories to communities...to encompass broad demands for social inclusion and citizenship" (1994, p. 97). The authoritarian state had ushered in structural changes typically associated with late industrialization; specifically, it attracted foreign and domestic capital into heavy industry (1994, p. 11). Such rapid state-sponsored industrialization shifted the composition of the business elite, putting industry in a dominant position over mining. This process was interrupted by the post-1973 international recession, which precipitated conflict between elites and the state over how to sustain the new industrial growth. Entrepreneurs had the perception that they were being closed out of policy-making agendas. Parastatals in both South Africa and Brazil were criticized for unfairly competing with private companies and for spending revenue on relatively unprofitable state-owned energy and arms industries (1994, p. 98). Seidman's state-capitalist class analysis provides the grounds for her observation that fractions of the capitalist class were withdrawing their support from the nondemocratic state.

Turning to the working class, Seidman asks if there is something about late industrializing countries that spurs workers to apply their militant discourse on class to that of citizenship. Rapid industrialization reshaped the industrial working class while denying workers and their families access to political and labor organizations. Seidman suggests that demanding greater access to state decision-making bodies, the industrialists created a political space in which labor movements could begin to demand the right to organize factory-based unions. For her, the timing of the new unionism boosted its chances of survival because dominant groups were already engaged in debates about democratization (1994, p. 10) (Figure 1, path A,B,G3 and C,G3, and F).

These four approaches all posit an affinity between global convergence and democratization, yet history cautions against easy generalizations. The early insight of Lipset (1960) regarding the affinity between development and democracy was turned on its head by a subsequent reverse wave of bureaucratic authoritarianism. What Moon writes about South Korea has been written by many: "[d]emocracy and globalization have not been necessarily complementary. They have often produced ambivalent and conflicting implications" (1996, p. 10). While globalization opens up economic spaces for the private sector, democratization opens up civil society to public interest and progressive social groups. In short, societies still confront the hostility inherent in democratic capitalism—those who own the means of production do not have a monopoly of power, and those who have political power are without ownership of the means of production (Marx 1964).

These authors formally insert class conflict into their interpretations. We learn from the second and third approaches that 1. global convergence has altered the social structure in a way that upsets the previous regime, and 2. these

newly created groups, middle classes and workers, prefer democracy. The fourth interpretation traces how convergence reduces the functions of the state and alters the relationship between the state and numerous social classes. This global convergence literature adds social processes that were taken for granted in the “favorable environment” perspective.

Global Shocks

Rather than identifying a secular trend such as global industrialization, another literature identifies global shocks that have had world-wide political reverberations. In a minimalist version, any shock may create a legitimacy crisis that alters the political regime. This is essentially Hobsbawm’s argument regarding the 1929 world market collapse and the subsequent fall of ten oligarchic regimes in Latin America (1967, p. 46). Most prominent in the democratization literature is, of course, the oil crisis. After the 1973 oil crisis, countries “such as the Philippines, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Brazil, and Uruguay were particularly hard hit” (Huntington 1991, p. 51), and it is in this population of countries that we see the movements toward redemocratization. The second oil crisis in 1979 not only fueled the Third Wave, but in “West Germany, France, Canada, and the United States, incumbent parties were turned out of office” (Huntington 1991, p. 51).

Martins (1986) traces the following path from the global oil shocks to democratization. The first oil shock produced a global recession. The Brazilian government, he argues, inattentive to this, continued with its original development program. Instead of delivering growth, that strategy created a domestic economic crisis exhibited in skyrocketing domestic interest and inflation rates, a drop in industrial production, a rise in the national debt, and an inability to service the debt (1986, p. 90). Such precarious conditions widened the gap between state promises and state accomplishments. This, and the need to renegotiate the debt with the IMF, “deprived the regime of one of its most efficient means of acquiring support from strategic groups” (1986, p. 91) and eventually cost the regime its legitimacy. Capitalists joined with the already existing mass-based opposition groups, undermining the nondemocratic regime.

The literature that enters the account with the third world debt crises of the 1980s also falls into this global shock camp. The debt crisis is the sequel to the oil crisis because windfall petro dollars were reloaned to third world nations, which had acquired substantial trade deficits owing to the increased cost of imported oil (Frieden 1991, p. 63). Castells and Laserna link democratic liberalization in Mexico back to the 1981–1982 debt crisis and the economic restructuring that it necessitated. They trace a process that began with a core nation: 1. “dominant economic aspects of the world economy (the United States) were willing to incorporate Mexico in the dynamic core of that economy”; and 2.

Mexico had the political capacity to pull it off, namely, “the efficient clientelistic system embracing the entire set of relationships between state and society” (1994, p. 68). That economic restructuring increased Mexico’s role as an export processing platform, increased Mexico’s ability to compete globally via technological modernization, and increased international inter-governmental and inter-firm cooperation. The restructuring and integration led business interests to realize they did not need the state as an intermediary with the United States. Mexico “no longer needed a central state” (1994, p. 73). These newly autonomous business interests generated historic electoral victories for the conservative party (PAN). Reduced state control and state ownership harmed a bureaucratic middle class whose control of the state had been its source of power and prestige. These newly disaffected middle classes provided the basis of electoral success for the Cardenas party (PRD). And finally, restructuring, debt negotiations, and the austerity programs secured Mexico’s credibility in the international finance community but led to “popular discontent over the deterioration of living conditions” (1994, p. 73). This too contributed to the electoral success of the leftist party of Cardenas (PRD). Castells and Laserna have constructed an account that goes beyond the global convergence models and offers us insight into the timing and processes of democratization (Figure 1, path A,D,B,G3 and C,G4).

Foreign Intervention

The contemporary foreign intervention scholarship has highlighted the positive role of the United States in promoting democracy. In 1991, the US Congress tied guidelines regarding democracy and human rights to foreign aid (Joseph Gichuhi Njoroje, 1996. “Linkage politics: foreign aid and political changes in Sub-saharan Africa,” MS: p. 3). And in 1991 and 1992 the United States and the Paris Club declared a moratorium on aid to Kenya and to Malawi pending the implementation of political reforms such as multiparty democracy, cessation of politically motivated torture and imprisonment, and the like. The analytical framework that attributes the global ascent of the democratic form to foreign intervention faces a colossal challenge. Foreign intervention does not uniformly bring democracy, sometimes it brings dictatorship.

The foreign intervention factor includes both long-term residence and short-term intervention. Regarding the former, many have hypothesized that former British colonies, on the average, had a higher probability of being democratic (Bollen & Jackman 1985, Crenshaw 1995). Rueschemeyer et al point out that limited suffrage even preceded independence in the British settler colonies—the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. British indirect rule had this beneficial outcome because it transferred representative institutions. In contrast, where the British exercised direct rule, it precluded the emergence of a civil society that might have nurtured democracy at a later

time (1992, p. 121). In Arab lands, the British armies “played a major role in organizing the new...profoundly undemocratic monarchies” (Markoff 1996, p. 75). While the legacy of British indirect rule might explain the surge of democratization in the post–World War II decolonization period, it gives us little purchase on the recent Third Wave.

The balance of the literature assesses how the foreign policy objectives of some countries determine the political regimes of others. “How important are the international factors influencing attempts at redemocratization? What motivates governments to proclaim the ‘promotion of democracy’ as an important goal of foreign policy...?” (Whitehead 1986, p. 3). Roquie argues that the hemispheric policy of successive US administrations—the alternation after 1945 between anti-Communist vigilance and democratizing preoccupations—imparts a rhythm to the phases of autocracy and the waves of demilitarization...” (1986, p. 126). This foreign factor is imposed on nations through the use of imitation and intimidation. The overthrow of Argentine President Frondizi in 1962, for example, was a response to national conflicts that borrowed heavily from the “defensive perspective outlined by the Pentagon in the framework of post-Cuban-Revolution strategic objectives” (1986, p. 126) (Figure 1, path G1). During the post-war period, the Common Market (allegedly) excluded Spain, Greece, and Portugal because of their political regime.¹ While Europe created a “long-term pressure for democratization” (Whitehead 1986, p. 23), the United States relegated the “promotion of democracy” to a lower priority (Whitehead 1986, p. 40). “The greater America’s security concern, the stronger was its benevolence toward the authoritarian Right” (1986, p. 42). From the time of Kennedy (who said he would not be averse to the overthrow of the elected Brazilian government) through Reagan, the US government did not behave in ways consistent with its principled advocacy of democracy (Whitehead 1986, p. 7) (Figure 1, path G1).

What then accounts for this shift? The end of the Cold War, a new historical conjuncture, offering the ruling hegemon(s) the luxury to tolerate and even support democracies. Huntington says as early as 1977, the International League for Human Rights indicated that human rights had become a national policy item (1991, p. 94). Carter started the conversation on human rights that Reagan institutionalized in the National Endowment for Democracy (founded in 1984). Yet the support for democracy seemed tenuous in the early years. Steinmetz (1994) asserts that the United States was only a weak champion of democracy to the Shah (Iran), Somozas (Nicaragua), and Marcos (Philippines). By the 1990s, however, the historical conjuncture of supporting dictators appeared to be coming to an end.

¹Poulantzas argues instead that it was fear of redundancy in agricultural production.

Such explanations for the rise of democracy are deduced from an analysis of the foreign policy needs of hegemonic powers. This literature clearly establishes that decisions to construct particular political regimes are not always endogenous, rather they receive a heavy contribution from exogenous forces. What is still puzzling is why core nations found the promotion of democracy in the developing world better suited to global capitalism. From where comes this good will?

Shifting Global Hegemon

The scholarship on hegemons does not stand totally apart from the above mentioned works, to the contrary it builds upon it. In this section, I refer to authors who explicitly conceptualize the global impact in terms of a shifting global hegemon. Wallerstein (1991), in his analysis of the collapse of the Eastern bloc, offers such a model. The collapse of Eastern Europe is not the triumph of Western liberalism; it is the aftermath of US hegemonic decline. Yalta (and the cold war) allowed the Soviet Union and the United States to keep order in their respective houses. For the USSR, it meant a monopoly over the Communist discourse, permitting it to direct or repress revolutionary socialist tendencies in Eastern Europe and the Third World. When faced with German and Japanese economic competition, US hegemony came undone. As the US hegemony collapsed, so too did the Yalta-approved hold that the Soviets had on its own citizens and those of the Eastern Bloc (Figure 1, path G1).

In his study of the 1970s' transitions, Poulantzas argues that the shift in global hegemon totally undermined the authoritarian regimes. "The fundamental question regarding the overthrow of the dictatorships in Portugal and Greece, and ... Spain, is... in what way have the so-called 'external' factors, the changes involved in the present phase of imperialism, been reproduced and internalized actually within the socio-economic and political structures of these countries?" (1976, p. 41). Let me summarize his analytical scheme for the Portuguese case.

Portugal, even in the post-World War II period, still derived its wealth from exploiting its colonies. Its international partners also benefitted from the colonial wealth. The changing world-system, however, shattered this pattern. As labor costs rose in the developed world, capitalists began to export capital to the less developed world (1976, p. 12) where a more intensive exploitation of labor was possible. In the early phase, industrial investments in developing countries were characterized by low levels of technology, expatriated profits, and concentration in manufactured products. Foreign capital entered Portugal in 1960 and boosted the growth in the industrial sector. While the GNP grew 1.5% and 5.9% in the agriculture and service sectors respectively, it grew 9.1% in the industrial sector. The second dimension of his analysis involves the shift from American to European dominance. By 1972, West German capital in-

vestments in Portugal had overtaken American capital. British capital was right behind (1976, p. 25). In Greece, Spain, and Portugal, the percentage of trade with the European Union was growing faster than trade with the United States.

The Portuguese project of colonial exploitation had a parallel political formation comprised of a numerically and politically weak working class; a petty bourgeoisie tied to the large state apparatus; and an oligarchy that included land owners who functioned chiefly as commercial and financial intermediaries for foreign capital associated with colonial exploitation. The new wave of foreign investment opened a space for domestic industries and gave birth to a new bourgeoisie (1976, p. 42). This new economic project differed substantially from the earlier one: It needed protected markets and state support to be competitive internationally. Nonetheless, the *Estado Novo* (the Portuguese authoritarian state) continued to allocate resources to the former project, dedicating, for example, 50% of the state budget to the colonial wars.

The new fractions unsuccessfully sought to renegotiate the compromise that the state had made with the older comprador bourgeoisie and to acquire a political weight equal to their new economic weight (to break the disproportionate grip of agrarian interests). This struggle led to deep conflicts within the power bloc which could not be resolved. Herein lies, for Poulantzas, the answer to the question: Why democracy? To resolve these conflicts without bloodshed, the state needed to be organized in a fashion that would permit ongoing negotiation and resolution, and it needed to allow the various classes to be represented by their own political organizations (Poulantzas 1976, p. 48).

[T]hese military dictatorships did not enable such contradictions to be regulated by the organic representation of these various fractions within the state apparatus, nor did it allow for the establishment of a compromise equilibrium without serious upsets.... We can add here that the fall or decline of these regimes corresponded to a redistribution of the balance of forces within the power bloc in favour of the fraction of capital polarized towards the Common Market and at the expense of the fraction polarized towards the United States, whose interests these regimes preponderantly represented, though not exclusively. (1976, p. 30)

But what are we to make of the role of popular struggles in democratization? The authoritarian regimes never were hegemonic among masses. Opposition existed in Portugal since the 1926 overthrow of its democracy (Schwartzman 1989), yet "(t)here was no frontal mass movement against the dictatorships, and in this sense, the popular struggles were not the direct or principal factor in their overthrow" (1976, p. 78). Nevertheless these struggles were obviously a determining factor. At this point, we can invoke those processes summarized above: The global hegemonic shift that gave rise to the new capitalist class also fostered urban migration and proletarianization of a section of

the peasantry. As we have seen, this often increases the volume of class conflict. Since economic protest, such as striking, was illegal under the dictatorship, class struggles became political struggles. Rather than reinforcing authoritarian relations, such transformations gave birth to a new pro-democracy coalition—new domestic fractions of capital and workers. In this aspect, Poulantzas' analysis moves beyond observing the emergence of a new working class. He argues that workers and mass organizations will be tolerated by the new capitalists for two reasons. First, because of the nature of their economic activity (they produce wage goods rather than exported goods), they can tolerate a more open and conciliatory position toward trade unions (1976, p. 56). Second, they need the mobilized masses for their own struggle against the agrarian bloc. After failing to end the dictatorship without the associated risks of mass mobilization, the new fractions of capital reluctantly accepted mass participation (1976, p. 56). Thus, the transition to democracy resulted from

...a conjunctural and tactical convergence of interests between the domestic bourgeoisie on the one hand and the working classes and popular masses on the other, its objective being the replacement of these regimes by "democratic" ones. (1976, p. 58) (Figure 1, path A,B,G3 and C,G4 and F)

In a grammatically less obstructed version of Poulantzas' argument, Logan locates the principal conflict in Spain and Portugal between the competing factions of capital tied to irreconcilable strategies of integrating into the world-system (1985, p. 149). Such a line of investigation might have application for the Eastern European cases. Noting the shifting hegemon, "Gorbachev frequently spoke of the USSR's European home" (Bergesen 1992, p. 140).

In Arrighi's interpretation of the new hegemonic environment, the shift from global hegemonic anarchy to a clear bipolar order had an impact on semiperipheral nations. In the postdepression and World War II period, direct investment came to supersede trade and territorial expansion as the leading vehicle of transnational competition: The UK flag of free trade was replaced by the US flag of free enterprise. Arrighi argues that the sustained process of capital investment, particularly under conditions of global competition (the post-World War II split between capitalism and communism), led to the eventual proletarianization of workers, even in rural areas (1985, p. 272). This resulted in a "resurgence of labor movements in forms that fascism could not contain.... [which] pushed political elites towards democratic socialist forms of political-economic regulation" (1985, p. 264). For Arrighi, the hegemonic shift unleashes its influence mainly through labor (1985, p. 273) (Figure 1, path A,C,G4 and F,G3).

In these works, we are supplied a stronger, more explicit relationship between the economic development of core nations and the political transforma-

tions in semiperipheral ones. And, at least for Poulantzas, there is an attempt to identify the symbiotic tie between elites and masses as they jointly mobilize for democracy.

World-System Cycles

World-system cycle models, rather than concluding with something episodic or accidental at the global level, invoke the systemic and cyclical nature of the world-system. The world-system develops through cycles of accumulation, which are composed of phases of capital formation, consolidation, and disintegration (Arrighi 1994, p. 10). The periods of stagnation, referred to as the B-phase, are accompanied by numerous phenomena such as intensified intercapitalist competition (1994, p. 88). B-phases are certainly associated with a reorganization of production, and they may or may not be associated with a shift in hegemonic dominance. Even when the hegemonic leader retains global leadership, the character of that hegemon will change. Thusly, the United States may retain its hegemonic control, but it must capitalize on new technologies and organizational forms to do so. In some cycles of decline, hegemonic leaders are unable to maintain their monopoly and fall behind new countries that are in a better position to exploit new economic opportunities. Bergesen describes, for example, how the hegemonic shift from England to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century was tied to a shift from the British organization of economic production in family firms to the US organization in corporations (1983). Poulantzas also placed his analysis on top of a hegemonic shift from the United States to Western Europe. While world-system cycle analysts are divided about whether a hegemonic shift is occurring, they do agree that the exit from the current cycle of stagnation will require new forms of economic organization. Furthermore, they link the contemporary Third Wave of democratization to the current economic contraction. This assertion diverges radically from that of Huntington and others who argue that “[T]he wave of democratizations that began in 1974 was the product of the economic growth of the previous two decades” (1991, p. 61).

While the shifts to democracy have taken place around the globe, they are not found at all levels of the global hierarchy. Democratization in the Third Wave has found more fertile grounds in the semiperiphery. Why democracy in the semiperiphery? Semiperipheral countries are hardest hit by the shock waves of the B-Phase. At the same time, periods of instability and intracore competition give nations in the semiperiphery opportunities to increase their relative power. Bergesen argues that democracy is a preferable national strategy because it is enabling. “The pressure of the downturn generates social and political crises, and... semi-peripheral states turn on themselves and reconstitute internally in the hope of better dealing with the crisis of slow growth, inflation, unemployment, and staggering debt payments” (1992, p. 144).

But why should instability in the semiperiphery lead to democracy rather than fascism or bureaucratic authoritarianism? We know that one of the domestic manifestations of a semiperipheral position can be a disarticulated economy, which in turn has detrimental effects on democratic stability (Schwartzman 1989). We also have an extensive scholarship that illustrates the necessity and efficacy of “developmental dictatorships” in the semiperiphery [Gerschenkron (1966) on late developers in Western Europe, Gregor (1979) on Mussolini, O'Donnell on Latin America, and Wallerstein (1979) on the world-system, to name a few]. According to these authors, aggressive non-democratic states historically have offered advantages over democratic ones. By restricting consumption and directing resources toward savings and investment, nations such as South Korea, Chile, and Brazil used nondemocratic regimes to improve their standing in the world-system hierarchy. We need to acknowledge the empirical fact that semiperipheral nations, which historically counted less frequently among democratic nations, now seem to make up the bulk of the Third Wave. Furthermore, we have to concede that while there were many authors who showed how developmental dictatorships were the natural response to a world crisis, there are now many more who are complacent to describe democracy as the natural response to a world shift. A world-system analysis sheds some light on this dilemma. The question must be revised to read: “Why were late developers more receptive to nondemocratic regimes in the B-phase of the free trade cycle and to democratic regimes in the B-phase of the global convergence cycle? Why is democracy now the way to negotiate the new global linkages?” Or, the even stronger version, which synthesizes aspects of core-semiperipheral relations and cyclical trends, “Why has democratic rule replaced authoritarian rule as the superior handmaiden of foreign capital penetration?”

One answer can be quickly deduced from the literatures that describe the relationship between the form of state and world-system location. Wallerstein argued that semiperipheral countries were more likely to have “interventionist” states because of the particular system of labor control found there. Authoritarian states were more successful in guaranteeing the semifeudal forms of labor control (tenancy or sharecropping) which were more prevalent in the semiperiphery (1984). Therefore, these semiperiphery nations, by virtue of global economic convergence, have lost their quality of “semiperipheralness” and taken on some qualities of the core, such as an enlarged working class and an industrial bourgeoisie that can contest the power of the landed aristocracy. Growth of these new sectors reduced the level of economic “disarticulation,” thereby removing the obstructions to democracy. Thus, as countries develop and move into this zone, “they become prospects for democratization” (Huntington 1991, p. 60). One shortcoming of this deduction is that it reduces the world-system component to the “global convergence” argument

and is silent about the world-system shifts and their repercussions for non-core countries. Furthermore, it doesn't speak to the dilemma of why the United States was an enthusiastic supporter of nondemocratic regimes some fifteen years earlier.

We need a model that speaks directly to aspects of this particular downturn, how it affects core-semiperipheral economic relations, and how this, in turn, contributes to democratization. By incorporating the global crisis into her analysis of Poland, Verdery takes one step in this direction. Core nations had two reactions to the crisis in the early 1970s: First, they earned money by lending abroad, and second, they shifted from Fordist production to flexible specialty production. These factors constituted the environment for socialist economies, which were equally affected by the global crisis. Governments first tried to salvage socialism without transforming it. "Instead of reforming the system from within, most Party leadership opted to meet their problems by...importing western capital and using it to buy advanced technology (or, as in Poland, to subsidize consumption)" (1993, p. 14). The world market was unable to absorb the increased volume of exported manufactured goods coming out of the socialist economies, and therefore, borrowers were unable to repay their debts. This debt crisis increased the power of that fraction of the ruling elite (within the Communist Party) that had advocated structural reforms, including markets and profits. Bureaucrats themselves created private companies at the interstices of the socialist state and the capitalist economy: They mediated export trade, and they imported computers for the state.

They also embarked on the new capitalist form of flexible specialization. Here, Verdery links the global cycle to democratization by contending that if the capitalist world still had been pursuing the Fordist conception of growth, it might have been more receptive to state organized "large-scale heroic production..." (1993, p. 16). Having moved to small-scale flexible specialization, however, core nations were less sympathetic to state directed growth (Figure 1, path A,B,C,G3,G4). Komlosy and Hofbauer add that the core nations were also less sympathetic to helping the East catch up to the West. Core nations followed the old Cold War regulations forbidding the export of advanced technology to Eastern Europe (1994, p. 135). As we have already seen in the discussion of Mexico and Brazil, the core response to the economic crisis created a new capitalism that struck at the heart of centralized control, undermining a host of state functions. Reformers invited foreign capital into their domain, but they also invited in privatization and other conditions that accompany such capital. In this way socialism was undermined by a government that had launched a venture to save it.

Cardoso also builds aspects of this particular B-phase into his work on Brazil. He posits that the global contraction led core nations to adopt economic policies toward non-core nations that not only created conflict between the

state and fractions of the capitalist class, but also undermined the regime's stability.

[T]he evolution of the international economic crisis and the pressure from international partners to place their equipment in Brazil's industrial projects...made it difficult for the Geisel government to keep its promise to sustain the national capital goods sector. Worsening foreign debt, fueled by the importation of foreign equipment...left the government even less room for maneuver in maintaining the goals of autonomy... [and] the local capital goods manufacturing sector" (1986, p. 144). "...It was against this background that the private sector discovered 'democracy' and some industrialists even rediscovered the constitution. (1986, p. 143)

In distancing themselves from the state, industrialists rediscovered democracy—"renewal of party-political activity and the emergence of pressure groups and social classes" (1986, p. 139), and then they discovered that the masses could be partners in this anti-government coalition. At the 1977 assembly of the National Manufacturing Sector Congress, entrepreneurs defended the workers' right to strike and asked for unqualified democracy and qualified economical liberalism (1986, p. 142). In 1978 they issued a public declaration which read "We wish to express our view of the path to economic development, based on social justice and promoted by democratic political institutions..." (1986, p. 145). For Cardoso, it was clearly the integration of the national development program into a "crisis-ridden" "free-enterprise" global economy that led the elite to withdraw legitimacy and demand a political opening.

The above B-phase answers link the nature of the current cycle of capitalist accumulation to core economic policies in less developed countries. In short, they give meaning to the notion of globalization of production. Having established this connection, we can draw from Seidman and others who demonstrate how this new globalization has transformed the working classes and led to new social movements, which the nondemocratic regimes found difficult to contain. In addition, drawing on the work of Poulantzas and others mentioned above, we see why the new technocratic and globally integrated elite may not have required total repression of the class conflict that was accompanying globalization. But why democratization? Democratization can actually decrease levels of mobilization and participation. By transforming a contentious and organized working class into a citizenry, democracy can more peacefully guide developing countries through the painful process of global integration. Because democracy encourages individuals to participate on the basis of unlimited collective identities (Catholics, Greens, Bavarians, etc), it fosters the individualization of class relations, particularly at the level of politics and ideology (Przeworski 1985, p. 12–13). Synthesizing many of these linkages, Robinson argues "All over the world, the United States is now promoting its ver-

sion of ‘democracy’ as a way to relieve pressure from subordinate groups for more fundamental political, social, and economic change” (1996, p. 6) (Figure 1, path G1,A,C,F,G3,G4). This B-phase world-system perspective seems to offer the greatest insights in deciphering the deeper significance of the Third Wave of democratization.

CONCLUSION

The literature contains many informed works that focus in one way or another upon the global-civil society connection. What do we know? The majority (albeit not unanimous) conclude that the transitions were not simply popular uprisings. Many conclude that fractions of the capitalist classes played a significant part in preferring and achieving an alternative state form—democracy. Others stress that domestic transformations are situated in a world-system in which core trajectories have inescapable ramifications for the economic and political regimes of non-core nations. Our greatest insights, it seems to me, come from those works that identify class conflict as the social mechanism linking world-system processes to national political dynamics. In this framework, domestic political structures become part of the evolving transnational fabric of economic relations.

While the culturally distinct and event-specific accounts of transitions to democracy give us invaluable insight into the unfolding of the transitions, they keep us from an understanding of the global networks in which nations have been embedded for ages. The historical clustering and its companion wave paradigm leave case-study researchers little option but to seek conversations with comparativists. Inversely, the macro accounts give us invaluable insight into deep structures but withhold from us understanding of individual actors and questions of agency. The cross-national variation and its companion “voice” literature leave macro researchers little choice but to seek conversations with area-study researchers. “They desired freedom” is as deficient of an explanatory model as “the B-phase made them do it.”

Such is a tall order. Specialization means that most researchers are unprepared to operate both multiple regression and ethnographic vehicles. For methodological and epistemological reasons, no one researcher is likely simultaneously to arrive at both “they desired freedom” and “the B-phase made them do it” conclusions. In fact these two perspectives rarely meet. Yet it is in that meeting that we have the most to gain. On the one hand, we have to avoid excessive fine-tuning of the hermetically sealed literatures of social movements or world-systems which stress single factor dynamics. On the other hand, we have to beware the false unions that substitute eclectic aggregation for theoretical synthesis. The excitement and frustrations of citizens in newly democratized nations have their counterparts in sociology. It is momentous.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to thank anonymous reviews for their helpful suggestions.

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